Laughter and Man

Μιμηλοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους γελοίων, μᾶλλον δὲ καταγελάτων παθῶν, τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐξελαστέον πολιτείας. Πάντων γὰρ τῶν λόγων ἀπὸ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους ῥεόντων, οὐχ οἶόν τέ ἐστι γελοίους τινὰς προέσθαι λόγους, μὴ οὐχὶ ἀπὸ γελοίου ἤθους φερομένους. Τὸ γὰρ, ' Οὐκ ἔστι δένδρον καλὸν, ποιοῦν καρπὸν σαπρόν· οὐδὲ μὴν δένδρον σαπρὸν ποιοῦν καρπὸν καλὸν,' κανταῦθα ἁρμοστέον· καρπὸς διανοίας γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἐστίν. Εἰ τοίνυν τοὺς γελωτοποιοὺς ἐξοικιστέον τῆς ἡμεδαπῆς πολιτείας, πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐπιτρέπειν γελωτοπειεῖν· ἄτοπον γὰρ, ὦν ἀκροατὰς γενέσθαι κεκώλυται, τούτων εὐρίσκεσθαι μιμητάς. Πολλῷ δὲ ἔτι ἀτοπώτερον, γελοῖον αὐτὸν σπουδὰζειν γενέσθαι, τουτέστιν ἐφυβριστον καὶ καταγελαστον. Εἰ γὰρ γελοίως σχηματισθῆναι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πομπαῖς ὀρῶνται τινες, οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείναιμεν· πῶς  ἂν εἰκότως τὸν ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπον, ἐπὶ τὸ γελοιότερον σχηματιζόμενον, ἀνασχοίμεθα, καὶ εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον; Οὔκουν ἐκόντες ἐπὶ τὸ γελοιότερον μεταστρεψαιμεν ἄν ποτε. Καὶ πῶς ἂν κατὰ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιτηδεύσαιμεν εἶναί τε καὶ φαίνεσθαι γελοῖοι, τὸ τιμιώτερον πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις κτημάτων κατομωκώμενοι, τὸν λόγον; Κλεύη μὲν οὔν ἐπιτηδεύειν ταῦτα ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ὁ τῶν γελοίων λόγος τοῖος ἀιροάσεως ἄξιος, διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ τῶν ἔργων ἐθίζων· χαριεντιστέον τε, οὐ γελωτοποιητέον. Ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν γέλωτα ἐπιστομιστέον· καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὅν μὲν δεῖ τρόπον ἐξαγόμενος, ἐμφαίνει κοσμιότητα· μὴ ταύτῃ δὲ χωρῶν, ἀκολασίαν ἐνδείκνυται. Ἁπλῶς γὰρ, ὁπόσα φυσικὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, ταῦτα ούκ ἀναιτεῖν ἐξ αὐτῶν δεῖ· μὰλλον δὲ μέτρον αὐτοῖς καὶ καιρὸνἐπιτιθέναι πρέποντα. Οὐ γὰρ ἐπειδὰν γελαστικὸν ζῶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος, γελαστέον τα πάντα· ἐπειδὰν οὐδὲ ὁ ἵππος, χρεμαετιστικὸς ὤν, χρεματίζει τὰ πάντα· ὡς δὲ ζῶα λογικὰ, σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἁρμοστέον εὐκράτως, τὸ αὐστηρὸν τῆς σπουδῆς ἡμων καὶ τὸ ὑπέρτονον χαλῶντας ἐμμελῶς, οὐκ ἐκλύοντας ἐκμελῶς· Κλημεντος του Αλεξανδρεως, Ὁ Παιδαγωγός, Λόγος Δεύτερος

And those who are imitators of ludicrous things, or rather of ridiculous states, should be driven from our state. 1 For since all speech flows from mind and character, there could not be ludicrous speech unless it proceed from a ludicrous inner state. For when it is said, 'It is not a good tree which produces corrupt fruit, nor a corrupt tree which produces good fruit,'2 one must apply it in these matters, for speech is the fruit of the mind. If, then, buffoons are to be ejected from our state, much more it is necessary that we do not turn to inciting laughter, for it would be absurd to be imitators of things to which we are prohibited to listen. And still more absurd it is to be keen to be ridiculous, that is, the target of insult and derision. For if we could not endure a ridiculous figure, such as we see in some processions, how could we without disgrace have the inner man made ridiculous, and that to one's face? Thus we should never willingly assume a ludicrous character. And how, then, can we take to being and appearing to be ridiculous in conversation, which is the most honourable of all human possessions? It is therefore disgraceful to wish to do this, since the conversation of buffoons is not worthy to be received, as by the very words employed it accustoms one to shameful deeds.  One may be witty, yes, but not a buffoon. But even laughter should be kept under restraint, for when given seasonably it shows orderliness, but when inappropriately it shows a lack of self control. For, in a word, whatever is natural to men one must not take from them, but rather lay down a measure and indicate suitable times. For because man is a animal that laughs does not mean he should be laughing at everything, any more than the horse, which is an animal that neighs, should neigh at everything. But as rational animals we are to control ourselves wisely, harmoniously easing the roughness and strain of our serious affairs, not inharmoniously tearing them apart. Clement of Alexandria, The Teacher, Book 2.  1 cf Plato, Republic Bk 10, 606c -607e 2 Mt 7.18