Power And Powerlessness

Sed et omnipotens quomodo es, si omnia non potes? Aut si non potes corrumpi nec mentiri nec facere verum esse falsum, ut quod factum est non esse factum, et plura similiter: quomodo potes omnia? An haec posse non est potentia, sed impotentia? Nam qui haec potest quod sibi non expedit et quod non debet potest. Quae quanto magis potest, tanto magis adversitas et perversitas possunt in illum et ipse minus contra illas. Qui ergo sic potest, non potentia potest, sed impotentia. Non enim ideo dicitur posse, quia ipse possit, sed quia sua impotentia facit aliud in se posse; sive aliquo alio genere loquendi, sicut multa improprie dicuntur. Ut cum ponimus 'esse' pro 'non esse', et 'facere' pro eo quod est 'non facere', aut pro 'nihil facere'. Nam saepe dicimus ei, qui rem aliquam esse negat: sic est, quemadmodum dicis esse; cum magis proprie videatur dici: sic non est quemadmodum dicis non esse. Item dicimus: iste sedet, sicut ille facit, aut: iste quiescit, sicut ille facit; cum 'sedere' sit quiddam non facere et 'quiescere' sit nihil facere. Sic itaque, cum dicitur habere potentiam faciendi aut patiendi quod sibi non expedit aut quod non debet, impotentia intelligitur per potentiam; quia quo plus habet hanc potentiam, eo adversitas et perversitas in illum sunt potentiores, et ille contra eas impotentior. Ergo, Domine Deus, inde verius et omnipotens, quia nihil potes per impotentiam, et nihil potest contra te. Sanctus Anselmus Cantuariensis, Proslogion, Caput VII Source: Migne PL 158.230b-d

But how are you omnipotent if you are not able to do everything? Or if you cannot be corrupted, or deceive or make the true false, so that what is is made what is not, and many other similar things, how are you said to be able to do everything? Or do these things come not from power, but from powerlessness? For he who can do these things does what does not benefit himself and he should not do. And the more he is able to do these things, so the much more are adversity and perversity able to find a place in him and he will be less oppossed to them. Therefore he who can act so, does not do these things by power but by powerlessness. For it is not said that he can do them because he is able to, but because of his powerlessness another can do them in him, or it is meant in some other manner, as many other words are used incorrectly, just as 'to be' for 'not to be' and 'to do' for 'not to do' or 'to do nothing'. So often we say when someone denies something exists 'so it is as you say it is,' when it would seem more correct to say 'so it is not as you say it is not.' Likewise we say, 'He sits,' as if he were doing something, or 'he rests,' as if he were doing something, when to sit is a certain way of not doing, and to rest is not to do. Thus when it is said there is power to do or suffer what does not benefit, or which should not be done, powerlessness should be understood by power, because the more of this 'power' there is, the more power adversity and perversity have in one, and against them one is more powerless. Therefore, Lord God, you are more truly omnipotent, because you do nothing through powerlessness, and nothing has power against you. Saint Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion, Chapter 7

The Work Of Evil

Discipulus: Sed cum omnibus quaestionibus meis satisfeceris, illud adhuc exspecto aperiri quid sit quod horremus audito nomine mali; et quid faciat opera, quae injustitia, quae malum est, videter facere, ut in raptore, in libidinoso cum malum nihil sit. Magister: Breviter tibi respondeo. Malum, quod est justitia, semper nihil est, malum vero, quod est incommoditas, aliquando sine dubio est nihil, ut caecitas; aliquando est aliquid, ut tristia et dolor. Et hanc incommoditatem, quae est aliquid, semper odio habmeus. Cum itaque audimus nomen mali; non malum quod nihil est, timemus; sed malum quod aliquid est, quod absentiam boni sequitur. Nam injustitiam et caecitatem, quae malum et nihil est, sequuntur multa incommoda, quae malum et aliquid sunt: et haec sunt quae horremus audito nomine mali. Cum autem dicimus quia injustia facit rapinam, aut caecitas facit hominem cadere in foveam, nequaquam intelligendum est quod injustitia aut caecitas faciant aliquid; sed quod si justitia esset in voluntate, et visus in ocula, nec rapine fieret, nec casus in foveam. Tale est, cum dicimus: Absentia gubernaculi impellit navm in scopulos, aut absentia freni facit equum discurre: quod non est aliud quam si gubernaculum adesset navi et frenum equo, nec venti navem impellerent , nec equus discurret. Sicut namque gubernaculo navis, et freno regitur equus; sic justitia gubernatur voluntas homini, et visu pedes. Sanctus Anselmus Cantuariensis, De Casu Diaboli, Caput XXVI Source: Migne PL 158.358b-359a

Pupil: But though you have satisfactorily answered all my questions, I still wait to be enlightened as to what it is that we dread when we hear the name of evil, and what causes the works which injustice, itself an evil, seems to cause, as in the case of robbery or of lust. Teacher: I shall answer you briefly. The evil which is injustice is always nothing, but the evil which is disadvantage is without doubt sometimes nothing, like blindness, but is sometimes something, like sadness and pain. And this disadvantage, which is something, we hate. Therefore, when we hear the name of evil, we do not fear the evil which is nothing but the evil which is something, that which follows from the absence of good. For example, injustice and blindness, which are evils and nothing, are followed by many disadvantages which are evils and something, and it is these latter which we dread when we hear the name of evil. For when we say that injustice causes robbery or that blindness causes a man to fall into a pit, it should not be understood that injustice and blindness cause something, but that if justice were in the will and sight in the eye, then neither the robbery nor the fall into the pit would happen. Such is the case when we say, 'The absence of a rudder drives the ship onto the rocks,' or 'The absence of a bridle makes the horse run wild.' Here we mean only that if the ship had a rudder or the horse a bridle, then the winds would not drive the ship,nor would the horse run wild. For just as a ship is directed by a rudder and a horse by reins, so a man's will is directed by justice and his feet by sight. Saint Anselm of Canterbury, On The Fall Of The Devil, Chap 26

The Fall Of Angels

Magister: Putasne bonos angelos similiter potuisse peccare, antequam mali caderent? Discipulus: Puto; sed ratione comprehendere vellem. Magister: Hoc certum habes quia si non potuerunt peccare, non potestate sed necessitate servaverunt iustitiam. Quare non magis meruerunt gratiam a Deo, quia steterunt, aliis cadentibus, quam quia servaverunt rationalitatem, quam perdere nequiverunt. Sed nec iusti recte, si bene consideres, dicerentur. Discipulus: Sic monstrat ratio. Magister: Illi ergo qui ceciderunt, si non peccassent cum possent, tanto meliores essent quam isti, quanto et vere essent iusti et gratiam a Deo mererentur. Unde sequitur quia aut electi homines maiores et meliores erunt angelis bonis, aut reprobi angeli perfecte non restaurabuntur, quoniam non tales erunt homines, qui pro illis assumentur, quales illi futuri erant. Discipulus: Haec duo penitus neganda existimo. Magister: Potuerunt igitur boni angeli peccare, ante casum malorum nec aliter, quam sicut ostensum est de illis qui peccaverunt. Discipulus: Aliter esse posse non video. Magister: Illi itaque angeli, qui magis voluerunt iustitiam quam habebant, quam illud plus quod non habebant, bonum quod quasi propter iustitiam, quantum ad voluntatem pertinuit, perdiderunt; iustitia retribuente, acceperunt et de illo, quod habebant, in vera securitate permanserunt. Quapropter adeo sunt provecti, ut sint adepti quidquid potuerunt velle; nec iam videant quid plus velle possint: et propter hoc peccare nequeunt. Illi vero angeli qui maluerunt illud plus, quod nondum Deus illis dare volebat, quam stare in iustitia, in qua facti erant, eadem iustitia iudicante, et illud propter quod illam contempserunt nequaquam obtinuerunt; et quod tenebant bonum amiserunt. Sic ergo distincti sunt angeli, ut adhaerentes iustitiae nullum velle bonum possint, quo non gaudeant; et deserentes illam, nullum velle queant, quo non careant. Discipulus: Nihil pulchrius, aut iustius hac distinctione. Sed si posses dicere, vellem audire cuiusmodi commodum illud fuit, quod et boni angeli iuste volendo sic profecerunt, et mali iniuste concupiscendo sic defecerunt. Magister: Quid illud fuerit non video; sed quidquid fuerit, sufficit scire quia fuit aliquid, ad quod crescere potuerunt; quod non acceperunt, quando creati sunt, ut ad aliud suo merito proficerent. Sanctus Anselmus Cantuariensis, De Casu Diaboli, Caput V-VI Source: Migne PL 158.334a-335a

Teacher: Do you think that the good angels were likewise able to sin before the fall of the evil? Pupil: I think so, but I wish to understand it rationally. Teacher: You are certain that if they were unable to sin, they maintained righteousness not by their own power but by necessity. Whence they would have no more merited grace from God because they had stood while the others fell, than because they preserved rationality, which they were unable to lose. But they would not rightly be called just, if you carefully consider the matter. Pupil: So reason shows. Teacher: Therefore they who fell, if they had not sinned when they were able to do so, then they would have been so much better than the good ones as much as they were truly righteous and merited grace from God. Thus it follows that the men who are elect would be better and greater than the good angels, or else the number of reprobate angels would not be perfectly restored, because the men who would assume their places would not be such as they would have become. Pupil: Both alternatives must be completely denied. Teacher: Therefore the good angels were able to sin before the fall of the evil ones, as was shown about the angels who did sin. Pupil: I do not see how it can be otherwise. Teacher: Thus those angels who preferred the righteousness which they did have to something more which they did not have, a good which as on account of righteousness, as much as it pertained to the will, they lost, received it through the reward of righteousness because of the good which they had and in which they remained truly secure. Whence they were promoted to that which they obtained whatever they were able to will, and they saw no more they could want, and on account of this they were not able to sin. But those angels who preferred that more which God do not yet wish to give them than standing in the righteousness in which they had been created, by the judgement of this righteousness did not obtain that because of which they scorned righteousness, and they lost the good they had possessed. So the angels were separated, so that those who adherered to righteousness are not able to will any good in which they do not delight, and those who deserted justice are able to will no good of which they are not deprived. Pupil: Nothing is more fair or just than this distinction. But, if you are able to say, I would like to hear what sort of benefit it was which the good angels thus gained by justly not willing, and which the evil angels by desiring unjustly thus lost. Teacher: I do not know what it was; but whatever it was, it is enough to know that it was something toward which they were able to grow, and which they did not receive when they were created, so that they might obtain it by their own merit. Saint Anselm of Canterbury, On The Fall Of The Devil, Chap 5-6

Truth And Deception

Cur, bona Domine, pie Redemptor, potens Salvator, cur tantam virtutem operuisti tanta humilitate? An ut falleres diabolum, qui fallenda hominem dejecit de paradiso? Sed utique veritas nullum fallit. Qui ignorat, qui non credit veritatem, ipse se fallit: qui videt veritatem, et odit vel contemnit, ipse se fallit. Veritas itaque nullum fallit. An ideo, ut ipse diabolus se falleret? Sed utique sicut veritas nullum fallit, ita non intendit ut aliquis se fallat, quamvis hoc dicatur facere, cum permittit. Non enim assumpsisiti hominem ut te notum operires, sed ut ignotum aperires. Verum Deum, verum hominem te dixisti, et operibus ostendisti. Res per se occulta fuit, non studio occultata; non sic est facta ut absconderetur, sed et suo ordine perficeretur; nec ut aliquem deciperet, sed ut quemadmodum opertebat fieret. Et si dicitur occulta; non est aliud quam non est omnibus revelata. Nam, etsi veritas non omnibus se manifestat, nulli tamen se negat. Ergo, Domine, nec ut falleres quod et quomodo faciendum erat, per omnia in veritate perstitisti. Qui ergo se fefellit in tua veritate; non de te, sed de propria queratur falsitate. Sanctus Anselmus Cantuariensis, Meditatio XI, De Redemptione Humana

Why, good Lord, pius Redeemer, powerful Saviour, why did you hide such power with such humility? Was it to deceive the devil who by deceiving man threw him from paradise? But truth deceives no one. He who is ignorant, he who does not believe the truth, deceives himself. He who sees the truth and hates it or despises it, deceives himself. The truth deceives no one. But was it so that the devil would deceive himself? But as the truth deceives no one, so it does not intend someone to deceive himself, although one may say this when it allows it. You did not assume human nature to hide what was knowable of you but that you reveal what was unknown. True God, true man, you pronounced yourself, and with works you showed it. The thing in itself was hidden, it was not made hidden; it was done not to escape attention, but by the way by which it could be brought to perfection; nor was it meant to deceive anyone but it was hidden that it be accomplished. And if it is said to hidden, it means something not revealed to everyone. For even if the truth does not manifest itself to everyone, it does not deny itself to anyone. Therefore, Lord, neither did you deceive nor did make anyone deceive himself, but everything in truth you established. Thus let anyone who has deceived himself about your truth, not you, but himself deplore for falsehood. Saint Anselm of Canterbury, from Meditation 11, On Human Redemption