Grace, Freedom and Sin

Atticus. Constat ergo inter nos, in bonis operibus post propriam voluntatem, Dei nos niti auxilio, in malis diaboli. Critobulus. Constat, et super hoc nulla contentio est. Atticus. Male ergo sentiunt, qui per singulas res quas agimus, Dei auferunt adjutorium, et illud quod Psalmista canit: Nisi Dominus aedificaverit domum, in vanum laborant qui aedificant eam. Nisi Dominus custodierit civitatem, frustra vigilat qui custodit eam ; et caetera hujuscemodi, perversis interpretationibus, immo risu dignis, ad alios sensus detorquere nituntur. Critobulus. Quid mihi necesse est contra alios dicere, cum meum responsum habeas? Atticus. Tuum responsum cujusmodi? Eos bene sentire, an male? Critobulus. Et quae me cogit necessitas, ut contra alios promam sententiam? Atticus. Disputationis ordo et ratio veritatis. An ignoras omne quod dicitur, aut esse, aut non esse; et aut inter bona, aut mala debere numerari? Hoc ergo de quo interrogo, aut bene dici, aut male, ingratis tibi fatendum est. Critobulus. Si in singulis rebus quas gerimus, Dei utendum est adjutorio, ergo et calamum temperare ad scribendum, et temperatum pumice terere, manumque aptare litteris, tacere, loqui, sedere, stare, ambulare, currere, comedere, jejunare, flere, ridere, et caetera hujuscemodi, nisi Deus juverit, non poterimus? Atticus. Juxta meum sensum non posse perspicuum est. Critobulus. In quo igitur liberum habemus arbitrium, et Dei in nos gratia custoditur, si ne hoc quidem absque Deo possumus facere? Atticus. Non sic donata est liberi arbitrii gratia, ut Dei per singula tollatur adminiculum. Critobulus. Non tollitur Dei adjutorium, cum creaturae ex semel dati liberi arbitrii gratia conserventur. Si enim absque Deo, et nisi per singula ille me juverit, nihil possum agere: nec pro bonis me juste operibus coronabit, nec affliget pro malis; sed in utroque suum vel recipiet, vel damnabit auxilium. Atticus. Dic ergo simpliciter, cur Dei auferas gratiam? Quidquid enim tollis in partibus, necesse est ut et in genere neges. Critobulus. Non nego gratiam, cum ita me a Deo asseram conditum, ut per Dei gratiam meae datum sit voluntati, vel facere quid, vel non facere. Atticus. Dormitat ergo Deus in operibus nostris, semel data liberi arbitrii potestate: nec orandus est, ut in singulis operibus nos juvet, cum voluntatis nostrae sit et proprii arbitrii, vel facere si volumus, vel non facere si nolumus. Critobulus. Quomodo in caeteris creaturis conditionis ordo servatur: sic concessa semel liberi arbitrii potestate, nostrae voluntati omnia derelicta sunt. Atticus. Ergo, ut dixi, non debeo a Deo per singula auxilium deprecari, quod semel meo datum est judicio? Critobulus. Si in omnibus ille cooperatur, non est meum, sed ejus qui adjuvat, immo qui in me cooperatur: praesertim cum absque eo facere nihil possim. Atticus. Oro te, non legisti: Non enim volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei ? Ex quibus intelligimus nostrum quidem esse velle et currere; sed ut voluntas nostra compleatur et cursus, ad Dei misericordiam pertinere, atque ita fieri, ut et in voluntate nostra et in cursu, liberum servetur arbitrium, et in consummatione voluntatis et cursus, Dei cuncta potentiae relinquantur. Scilicet nunc mihi Scripturarum testimonia replicanda sunt, quomodo per singula Dei a sanctis flagitetur auxilium et in singulis operibus suis, illo adjutore et protectore uti desiderent. Lege totum Psalterium, omnes sanctorum voces, nihil erit, nisi ad Deum in cunctis operibus deprecatio. Ex quo perspicue ostenditur, te aut Dei negare gratiam, quam tollis in partibus; aut si in partibus dederis, quod nequaquam te velle manifestum est, in nostram sententiam transire, qui sic liberum homini servamus arbitrium, ut Dei per singula adjutorium non negemus. Critobulus. Captiosa ista est conclusio, et de dialecticorum arte descendens. Mihi autem nullus auferre poterit liberi arbitrii potestatem, ne, si in operibus meis Deus adjutor exstiterit, non mihi debeatur merces, sed ei qui in me operatus est. Atticus. Fruere liberi arbitrii potestate, ut contra Deum armes linguam tuam, et in eo te liberum probes, si tibi liceat blasphemare. Verum super hoc quid sentias, nulli dubium est, et praestigia confessionis tuae apertissima luce claruerunt. Nunc revertamur ad id, unde disserere coepimus. Dic mihi, si tibi videtur, hoc quod cum Dei adjutorio paulo ante dicebas, posse hominem non peccare si velit, in perpetuum dicas, an ad tempus et breve? Critobulus. Superflua interrogatio est. Si enim ad tempus et breve dixero: nihilominus referetur ad perpetuum. Quidquid enim ad breve dederis, hoc concedes et in perpetuum. Atticus. Quid dicas, non satis intelligo. Critobulus. Itane durus es, ut manifesta non sentias? Atticus. Non me pudet nescire quod nescio. Et de quo futura est disputatio, debet inter utrumque convenire quem sensum habeat. Critobulus. Ego hoc assero, qui potest uno die se abstinere a peccato, posse et altero: qui duobus, posse et tribus; qui tribus, posse et tringinta; atque hoc ordine posse et trecentis, et tribus millibus, et quamdiucumque se voluerit abstinere. Atticus. Dic ergo simpliciter posse hominem in perpetuum esse sine peccato si velit. Possumusne omne quod volumus? Critobulus. Nequaquam. Neque enim possum quidquid voluero; sed hoc solum dico, hominem sine peccato posse esse, si velit. Atticus. Quaeso ut mihi respondeas. Hominem me putas, an belluam? Critobulus. Si de te ambigo, utrum homo, an bellua sis, ipse me bellnam confitebor. Atticus. Si ergo, ut dicis, homo sum, quomodo cum velim, et satis cupiam non peccare, delinquo? Critobulus. Quia voluntas imperfecta est. Si enim vere velles, vere utique non peccares. Atticus. Ergo tu qui me arguis non vere cupere, sine peccato es, quia vere cupis? Critobulus. Quasi ego de me dicam, quem peccatorem esse confiteor, et non de paucis et raris, si qui voluerint non peccare. Atticus. Interim ex meo tuoque judicio, et ego qui interrogo, et tu qui respondes, peccatores sumus. Critobulus. Sed possumus non esse si velimus. Atticus. Dixi me velle non peccare, te quoque hoc sentire non dubium est. Quomodo ergo quod uterque volumus, uterque non possumus? Critobulus. Quia plene non volumus. Atticus. Da ergo qui majorum nostrorum plene voluerint et potuerint. Critobulus. Hoc quidem non facile est ostendere. Neque enim quando dico hominem posse esse sine peccato si velit, aliquos fuisse contendo; sed simpliciter posse esse si velit. Aliud namque est esse posse, quod Graece dicitur δύναμις; aliud est esse, quod ipsi appellant ἐνέργεια. Possum esse medicus; sed interim non sum. Possum esse faber; sed necdum didici. Quidquid igitur possum: licet necdum sim, tamen ero si voluero. Atticus. Aliud sunt artes, aliud id quod per artes est. Medicina et fabrica, et artes caeterae inveniuntur in plurimis: sine peccato autem esse perpetuo, divinae solius est potestatis. Itaque aut da exemplum qui absque peccato fuerint in perpetuum: aut si dare non potes, confitere imbecillitatem tuam, et noli ponere in coelum os tuum, ut per esse, et esse posse,stultorum illudas auribus. Quis enim tibi concedet, posse hominem facere quod nullus umquam hominum potuerit? Ne tu dialecticis imbutus quidem es? Si enim potest homo, non posse tollitur. Si autem non potest, posse subvertitur. Aut concede mihi aliquem potuisse, quod fieri posse contendis: aut si nullus hoc potuit, invitus teneberis, nullum posse, quod possibile jactitas. Inter Diodorum et Chrysippum valentissimos dialecticos ista contentio est. Diodorus id solum posse fieri dicit, quod aut sit verum, aut verum futurum sit. Et quidquid futurum sit, id fieri necesse esse. Quidquid autem non sit futurum, id fieri non posse. Chrysippus vero et quae non sunt futura, posse fieri dicit: ut frangi hoc margaritum, etiam si id numquam futurum sit. Qui ergo aiunt hominem posse esse absque peccato si velit, non poterunt hoc verum probare, nisi futurum docuerint. Cum autem futura incerta sint omnia, et maxime ea quae numquam facta sunt,  perspicuum est eos id futurum dicere, quod non sit futurum; Ecclesiaste hanc confirmante sententiam: Omne quod futurum est, jam factum est in priori saeculo. Santus Hieronymus, Dialogus Adversus Pelagianos, Liber I Source: Migne PL 23.499d-503a

Atticus: Therefore it is settled among us that in our good works, besides our own will, we depend on the help of God, and on the devil in evil acts? Critobulus: It is settled and concerning this there is no argument. Atticus: Therefore they think erroneously who would not have the help of God in every single action that we perform, and to that which the Psalmist sings, 'Unless the Lord build the house, they labor in vain who build it. Unless the Lord guard the city, vainly he watches who guards it.' 1 and other things like this, they give perverse interpretations, truly worthy of laughter, as they strive to twist it to mean something else. Critobulus: Why is it needed for me to speak against others when you have my answer on this? Atticus: What is your answer? Do they think well or poorly? Critobulus: And what necessity forces me that I should make known my thought against them? Atticus: The order of the argument and care for truth. Do you not know that whatever we say either is or it not, and that it should be classified among the good or the evil? Therefore, concerning what I ask, whether they spoke well or poorly, you must speak despite your unwillingness. Critobulus: If in every single action that we do God must be a helper, will it not then be that, unless God gives aid, we will not be able to fashion a pen for writing, and smooth it with pumice after, and apply our hand to the making of letters, and maintain silence, and talk, and sit, and stand, and walk, and run, and eat, and fast, and cry, and laugh, and do other similar things? Atticus: According to my mind clearly it would not be possible. Critobulus: In what way, then, do we have free will with the grace of God preserved in us, if we without God cannot do these things? Atticus: The grace of the free will was not given that it do away with the assistance of God in everything. Critobulus: The help of God is not taken away when creatures are preserved by the grace of the free will that has been given them once. For if without God, and unless He helps me in every action, I can do nothing, He will neither crown me rightly for good deeds done, nor will He punish for evil deeds, but in both cases He will either admit or condemn His own assistance. Atticus: Simply tell me why you rule out the grace of God. For whatever you take from the parts, you must necessarily refuse to the whole. Critobulus: I do not deny grace when I assert that I was fashioned by God in such a way that through the grace of God the will was given to me either to act or not to act. Atticus: Therefore God rests as far as our works are concerned once the power of free will has been given, nor should there be prayer that He help us in each of our acts when it is of our own will to do what we wish to do or not to do what we do not wish to do. Critobulus: Just as in other creatures the order of creation is preserved, so once the power of free will his been given everything is left to our will. Atticus: Therefore, as I said, do I not need to ask God for help in every act, that which has been given once and for all in my own judgement? Critobulus: If He is a cooperator in everything, the act is not mine but it is of He who helps, or rather to Him who cooperates, especially since without Him I can do nothing. Atticus: I ask you, have you not read, 'For it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of the mercy of God?' 2 From which we understand that ours it is to will and to run, but the accomplishment of our willing and running belongs to the mercy of God, and so it comes about that in our own willing and our running the free will is preserved, and the accomplishment of our willing and our running require the power of God. Now it seems clear to me that at this point the testimony of Scripture should be quoted to show how those who were holy begged God to help them in every act, and they desired Him as helper and protector in every work of theirs. Read the whole Psalter, the words of all those who were holy, nothing will be found but prayer to God in every deed. From which it is easily seen that you either deny the grace of God, which you take away from the parts, or, if you grant it to the parts, which it is obvious you do not wish to do, you cross over into our judgement, who preserve the free will of man while not denying the help of God in every deed. Critobulus: This conclusion is captious and is drawn from the art of the dialecticians. To me, however, no one will be able to deny the power of the free will, lest, if God exists as my helper in my works, the reward not be imputed to me, but to Him who worked in me. Atticus: Delight in the power of free will so that you may arm your tongue against God and so prove yourself free since you are allowed to blaspheme. Of what you think about this there is no doubt and the deceits of your confession shine with brightest light. But now let us return to the place where we began our discussion. Tell me, if it pleases you, when you said a little while ago that it was possible for man with the help of God not to sin if he wished it, did you mean forever, or temporarily and briefly? Critobulus: A superfluous question. For if I were to say temporarily and briefly it will still be taken as forever, for whatever you grant to a brief span of time you also admit forever. Atticus: I do not fully understand what you are saying. Critobulus: Are you so dull that you do not grasp what is obvious? Atticus: I am not ashamed to not know what I do not know. And for the future of this discussion we must both agree on the definition of what we have before us. Critobulus: I assert that he who can abstain from sinning for one day can also do so for another day, and he who can do it for two days can also do it for three days, and he who can do it for three days can also do it for thirty days, and with this understanding he can also abstain from sinning for three hundred days, and as for as long a time as he wants. Atticus: So simply say that man can be without sin forever if he wants to. Are we not able to do everything that we want to? Critobulus: Not at all. For I cannot do everything that I wish. But all I am saying is that man can be without sin if he wants to. Atticus: I ask you to answer me this: do you think me a man or a beast? Critobulus: If I am in doubt as to whether you are a man or a beast I will confess myself a beast. Atticus: If then, as you say, I am a man, how is it that when I wish and truly desire not to sin I go astray? Critobulus: Because your will is imperfect. For if you truly wanted to, certainly you would not sin. Atticus: Therefore you who claim that I do not truly desire to be without sin, are without sin because you truly desire it? Critobulus: As if I were speaking of myself, I who confess that I am a sinner, and not of those few and rare individuals who if they wish do not sin. Atticus: Meanwhile in mine and your judgement, I, who am asking the question, and you, who answer, are sinners? Critobulus: But we are able not to be if we wish. Atticus: I said that I did not wish to sin, and you also doubtless think this. How then is it that what we both want we are not able to do? Critobulus: Because we do not wholly want it. Atticus: Then give me some of those great ones among us who fully wish it and do it. Critobulus: This is certainly not easy to show. For when I say that man can be without sin if he wishes I am not contending that there were some individuals like this, but simply that a man is able to be it if he wants it. For what in Greek is called δύναμις, that is, 'possibility' is one thing and that which they name ἐνέργεια, that is, 'actuality' is another. I can be a physician but in the meantime I am not. I can be a craftsman but I have not yet learnt how. Therefore whatever I can be, although I am not yet that thing, nevertheless, I shall be if I want to. Atticus: The arts are one thing, that which comes into being as the result of the art is something else. Medical skill, craftsmanship, and the other arts, are found in many individuals, but to be without sin forever is of the Divine power alone. Therefore either give example of those who were without sin forever, or if you cannot do so confess your inability and stop placing your mouth in heaven 3and with talk of being and being possible deceiving the ears of the foolish. For who will grant you that a man is able to do what no man has ever been able to do? Have you not any education in dialectics at all? If a man can do something, impossibilty is ruled out. But if a thing is not possible for man, possibility is denied. Either grant me that someone was able to do what you contend is possible, or, if no person was able to do it, you will have to admit, unwillingly, that no man can do what you boast is possible. Between the most capable dialecticians Diodorus and Chrysippus this is the argument. Diodorus says that only that is possible which either is true or will be true. And whatever will be in the future is necessarily possible. But whatever will not be in the future is impossible. Chrysippus, however, says that those things are also possible that will not be, as it is possible for a particular pearl to break, even if it never happens. Therefore they who say that man can be without sin if wishes it are not be able to prove this to be true, unless they teach that it will take place in the future. But since all future things are uncertain, especially those things that never have been done, it is obvious that what they are speaking of in the future will not take happen. Ecclesiastes confirms this view: 'Everything that will be has been done in the ages that were before.' 4 Saint Jerome, Dialogue Against the Pelagians, Book 1 1 Ps 126.1 2 Rom 9.16 3 Ps 72.9 4 Eccles 1.9,10