Good Teaching

Οὗτος με πρῶτος καὶ μόνος καὶ τὴν Ἐλλήνων φιλοσοφίαν φιλοσοφεῖν προὺτρέψατο, τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς ἰδίοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ τοῦ περὶ ἠθῶν ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀνασχέσθαι λόγου πείσας, οὐκ ἂν πεισθέντα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις, παλιν ὁμολογῶ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς μὲν, δυστυχῶς δὲ, μικροῦ δεῖν, ἡμῖν. Οὐ μενοῦν οὐδὲ πλείοσιν ἐνέτυχον τὸ πρῶτον, ὀλίγοις δέ τισι τοῖς διδάσκειν ἐπαγγελλομένοις, ἀλλὰ γὰρ πᾶσι μέχρι ῥημάτων τὸ φιλοσοφειν στήσασιν. Οὗτος δέ με πρῶτος καὶ τοῖς λόγοις φιλοσοφεῖν προυτρέψατο, τοῖς ἔργοις φθάσας τὴν διὰ λόγων προτροπὴν, οὐκ ἀπαγγέλλων μόνον ῥήματα μεμελετημένα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λέγειν ἀξιῶν, εἰ μὴ σὺν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ πρᾶξαι τὰ εῑρημένα ἀγωνιουμένῃ τοῦτο ποιοῖ· ἤ τοιοῦτον ἑαυτὸν παρασχέσθαι πειρώμενος, οἶον τοῖς λόγοις διέξεισι τὸν καλῶς βιωσόμενον, καὶ παράδειγμα μὲν, ἐβουλόμην εἰπεῖν, ἐκθέμενος σοφοῦ. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀλήθειαν ἡμῖν, οὐ κομψείαν ἐπηγγείλατο ὁ λόγος ἄνωθεν, παράδειγμα μὲν αὐτὸν σοφοῦ οὐδέπω λέγω· καίτοι γε εἰπεῖν ἐθέλων εἶναί τε ἀληθές· ἀλλὰ ἐῶ νῦν τοῦτο. Οὐ παράδειγμα τοίνυν ἀκριβὲς, ἐξομοιοῦν δὲ καὶ ἄγαν ἐθέλοντα, σπουδῆ πάσῃ καὶ προθυμίᾳ βιαζόμενον, εἰ δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπων δύναμιν· καὶ μέντοι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἑτέρους τοιούτους πλάττειν, οὐ λόγων ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ ἐπιστήμονας τῶν περὶ ὁρμῶν, τῶν δὲ ὁρμῶν αὐτῶν· ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἄγχων, καὶ οὐ μικρὰν μοῖραν ἐκάστης ἀρετῆς, τάχα δὲ καὶ σύμπασαν, εἴπερ ἐχωρήσαμεν, ἐπιφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ· δικαιοπραγεῖν μὲν καὶ ἀναγκάζων, εἰ δεῖ λέγειν, διὰ τὴν ἰδιοπραγίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾖ προσθέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἔπεισεν· ἀπάγων μὲν τῆς κατὰ τὸν βίον πολυπραγμοσύνης, καὶ τοῦ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ὀχληροῦ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ περισκοπεῖν ἐπαρας καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ὄντως πράττειν. Τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι τὸ δικαιοπραγειν, και ταύτην τὴν δικαιοσύνην τήν γε ἀληθῆ, καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων φιλοσόφων τινὲς εἰρήκασι, τὴν ἰδιοπραγίαν λέγοντες, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀνυσιμώτερον πρὸς μακαριότητα ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς προσιοῦσιν· εἴπερ γε ἐστὶ τῆσδε τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονέμειν, καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐκάστοις. Τί γὰρ ἂν ἴδιον εἴη ψυχῆς ἕτερον; Τί δὲ οὕτως ἄξιον ἤ τὸ ἐπιμέλεσθαι ἑαυτῆς, οὐκ ἔξω βλέπουσαν, οὐδ' ἀλλοτριοπραγοῦσαν, οὐδὲ, συνελόντι εἰπεῖν ἀδικοῠσαν ἑαυτὴν τὴν χειρίστην ἀδικίαν, ἀλλ' ἔνδον πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἀπεστραμμένην, αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ ἀποδιδοῦσαν καὶ δικαιοπραγοῦσαν; Οὕτως μὲν δίκαια πράττειν, εἰ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀναγκάζων ἐπαίδευε· προνεῖν δὲ πάλιν οὐχ ἦττον, τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἑαυτοὺς γινώσκειν ἐθέλειν τε καὶ πειρᾶσθαι· τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἄριστον φιλοσοφίας ἔργον, ὅ δὴ καὶ δαιμόνων τῷ μαντικωτάτῳ ἀνατίθεται ὡς πάνσοφον πρόσταγμα, τὸ, Γνῶθι σαυτον. Τὸ δὲ εἶναι ὄντως ἔργον φρονήσεως, καὶ ταύτην εἴναι τὴν θείαν φρόνησιν, καλῶς τοῖς παλαιοῖς λέγεται· τὴν αὐτὴν ὄντως οὖσαν Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετήν· αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἑαυτὴν ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ὁρᾷν μελετώσης, καὶ τὸν θεῖον νοῦν, εἰ ἀξία γένοιτο τῆς κοινωνίας τῆσδε, ἐν αὐτῇ κατοπτριζομένης, ὁδόν τε ἀπόῥῥητόν τινα ταύτης ἀποθεώσεως ἐξιχνευομένης. Ἀκολούως δὲ καὶ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ φρόνησιν τήνδε, τῆς ψυχῆς ἑαυτὴν γινωσκούσης, εἴ ποτε αὐτῇ τοῦτο γένοιτο· ταύτην γὰρ εἶναι πάλιν τὴν σωφροσύνην, σώαν τινὰ φρόνησιν οὖσαν· ἀνδρίζεσθαι δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐμμένοντας ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἐπιτηδεύσεσι, καὶ οὐκ ἀποπιπτοντας οὖθ' ἐκουσίως οὔθ ὑπό τινος ἀνάγκης, φυλάσσοντας δὲ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς τῶν εἰρημένων· καὶ ταύτην εἴναι σώτειράν τινα καὶ φύλακα δογματίζων οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην.  Ἅγιος Γρηγόριος ὁ θαυματουργός, Εἰς Ὀριγένην Προσφώνητικος, ΙΑ' Source: Migne PG 10 1081c-1085a

Origen was also the first and only one that urged me to study the philosophy of the Greeks, persuading me by his own moral example both to hear and to hold to the doctrine of morals, while as yet I had not been persuaded to that, so far as other philosophers were concerned, again I confess, indeed not rightly but unhappily telling you a little of it. At first I did not associate with many but only with a few who claimed to be teachers, but they all established their philosophy only as far as words, but this man, however, was the first who led me to philosophize by his words, as he put the exhortation in deeds before he gave it in words, and did not merely pronounce well practiced sentences; indeed he did not deem it of any value to speak at all but with a sincere mind striving for the deeds of the things expressed, whence he endeavoured  to show himself as like the one who in his discourses he exhibits as living well, he  himself, I would say, offering the pattern of the wise man. But as our discourse has announced itself as concerned with truth, and not refined speech, I shall not speak here of him as the pattern of the wise man, and yet, if I wished to speak of him so, it would be truth. But for now I go on. I shall not speak of him, then, as a perfect pattern, but as one who truly wishes to imitate it, and strives for it with all zeal and earnestness, even, if I may say so, beyond the ability of men, and, moreover, as one who labours to make us who are so different similar, not mere masters and knowers of the teachings of the movements of the soul, but of the movements themselves. For he drove us to works and words, and not into a small part of each virtue, but, if we could encompass it, into the whole, compelling us, if I may say so, to practice righteousness by the personal action of the soul, persuading us to apply ourselves to it, and leading us away from the many concerns of life and from the troubles of the forum, and lifting us to the nobler vocation of looking into ourselves and to acting concerning the things that truly concern us. Now that this is to practice righteousness and that this is the true righteousness, some also of the ancient philosophers have told, calling it personal action, I think, and they have affirmed that it is more efficacious for blessedness, both for themselves and those with them, if indeed it is of virtue to reward according to merit and each according to what he has done. For what else may be proper to the soul? Or what could be so worthy of it than it have care for itself, not looking outwards, nor busying itself with other affairs, not, to speak shortly, doing the worst injustice to itself, but turning inwardly upon itself, to give itself over to itself, and so act righteously? Thus he taught with a certain compulsion, if I may speak so, the practice of righteousness, not neglecting prudence even so, but teaching us to be with ourselves, and to wish and try to know ourselves, and this is indeed the most excellent work of philosophy, ascribed to the most prophetic of spirits as the command of highest wisdom, 'Know yourself.' And that this is the true work of prudence and that such is the Divine prudence is by the ancients well affirmed, for in this there is one virtue of God and man; the soul exerting itself to see itself as in a mirror, and there the Divine mind, if it be worthy of such relation, in that tracing out a certain inexpressible way to attain a kind of apotheosis. And with this prudence comes also temperance conserving the prudence of the soul that knows itself, if that is to be, for this temperance, again, surely is a stable prudence; and also fortitude is there, for the firm preservation of all that we have spoken of as being befitting, without falling away, either voluntarily or by some force, in the guarding and keeping of what has been taught, for he teaches that this virtue is a kind of protector and guardian. Saint Gregory Thaumaturgus, from the Oration to Origen, Chapter 11