Evil and Free Will

Aug: Cum igitur eisdem rebus alius male, alius bene utatur; et is quidem qui male, amore his inhaereat atque implicetur, scilicet subditus eis rebus quas ei subditas esse oportebat, et ea bona sibi constituens, quibus ordinandis beneque tractandis ipse esse utique deberet bonum: ille autem qui recte his utitur, ostendat quidem bona esse, sed non sibi; non enim eum bonum melioremve faciunt, sed ab eo potius fiunt: et ideo non eis amore agglutinetur, neque velut membra sui animi faciat, quod fit amando, ne cum resecari coeperint, eum cruciatu ac tabe foedent; sed eis totus superferatur, et habere illa atque regere, cum opus est, paratus, et amittere ac non habere paratior: cum ergo haec ita sint, num aut argentum et aurum propter avaros accusandum putas, aut cibos propter voraces, aut vinum propter ebriosos, aut muliebres formas propter scortatores et adulteros, atque hoc modo caetera, cum praesertim videas et igne bene uti medicum, et pane scelerate veneficum?  Ev: Verissimum est, non res ipsas, sed homines qui eis male utuntur esse culpandos.  Aug: Recte: sed quoniam et quid valeat aeterna lex, ut opinor, videre iam coepimus, et quantum lex temporalis in vindicando progredi possit, inventum est; et rerum duo genera, aeternarum et temporalium, duoque rursus hominum, aliorum aeternas, aliorum temporales sequentium et diligentium, satis aperteque distincta sunt: quid autem quisque sectandum et amplectendum eligat, in voluntate esse positum constitit; nullaque re de arce dominandi, rectoque ordine mentem deponi, nisi voluntate: et est manifestum, non rem ullam, cum ea quisque male utitur, sed ipsum male utentem esse arguendum: referamus nos, si placet, ad quaestionem in exordio huius sermonis propositam, et videamus utrum soluta sit; nam quaerere institueramus quid sit male facere, et propter hoc omnia quae dicta sunt, diximus. Quocirca licet nunc animadvertere et considerare, utrum sit aliud male facere, quam neglectis rebus aeternis, quibus per seipsam mens fruitur, et per seipsam percipit, et quae amans amittere non potest, temporalia et quaeque per corpus hominis partem vilissimam sentiuntur, et nunquam esse certa possunt, quasi magna et miranda sectari. Nam hoc uno genere omnia malefacta, id est peccata, mihi videntur includi. Tibi autem quid videatur, exspecto cognoscere.  Ev: Est ita ut dicis, et assentior, omnia peccata hoc uno genere contineri, cum quisque avertitur a divinis vereque manentibus, et ad mutabilia atque incerta convertitur. Quae quamquam in ordine suo recte locata sint, et suam quamdam pulchritudinem peragant; perversi tamen animi est et inordinati, eis sequendis subici, quibus ad nutum suum ducendis potius divino ordine ac iure praelatus est. Et illud simul mihi videre iam videor absolutum atque compertum, quod post illam quaestionem, quid sit male facere, deinceps quaerere institueramus, unde male facimus. Nisi enim fallor, ut ratio tractata monstravit, id facimus ex libero voluntatis arbitrio.   Sanctus Augustinus Hipponensis, De Libero Arbitrio

Augustine: Thus the same things are used by one badly and by another well and the one who uses them badly cleaves to them and becomes ensnared by them, for he serves that which should serve him, attaching himself to those goods which he cannot use properly because he is not good. For those things do not make the user good or better, in truth, they become good by being used, and so someone who uses them well does not become attached to them, and they are not made, as it were, limbs of his soul, which happens in loving them, so that when they are cut off, he is not disfigured by pain or loss; but he is far above such things, ready to possess and make use of them as the need arises, and even readier for loss and to be without them. Since this is so, you should realise that we should not fault silver and gold because of the avaricious, or food because of gluttons, or wine because of drunkards, or female beauty because of fornicators and adulterers, and so on, especially since you know fire can be used to heal and bread to poison. Evodius: Clearly it is not the things themselves but the evil use that men make of them that is culpable. Augustine: Correct. But now we have begun to see what eternal law can do and we have found out how far temporal law can go in punishing evildoing, we have clearly and carefully distinguished between two sorts of things, eternal and temporal, and in turn between two sorts of human beings, those who pursue and love eternal things and those who pursue and love temporal things. We have determined that the choice to follow and embrace one or the other lies in the will and that only the will can depose the mind from its stronghold of power and deprive it of right order. And it has become clear that we should not blame a thing when someone uses it wrongly, we should blame the one who uses it wrongly. Given that, why don't we return to the question we posed at the beginning of this discussion and see whether it has been answered? We set out to discover what evildoing is. This whole discussion was aimed at answering that question, and we are now in a position to ask whether evildoing is anything other than neglecting eternal things, which the mind perceives and enjoys by means of itself and which it cannot lose if it loves them, and instead of pursuing temporal things as if they were great and marvelous things, things perceived by means of the body, that least valuable part of a human being, and which can never be certain, and so it seems to me that all evil deeds, that is, all sin, fall into this category. But I would know how it seems to you. Evodius: It is as you say and I agree; all sins are contained in one class, that is, when someone turns from Divine things which truly persist and turns toward changeable and uncertain things. These things do have their proper place and they have a certain beauty of their own but when a perverse and disordered soul pursues them it becomes enslaved to the very things that Divine law and order command it to rule over. And I think we have answered another question. After we asked what evildoing is, we set out to discover the source of our evildoing and, unless I err, our argument has showed that we do evil by the free choice of the will. Saint Augustine of Hippo, On Free Will