The Simple Trinity

Est itaque bonum solum simplex et ob hoc solum incommutabile, quod est Deus. Ab hoc bono creata sunt omnia bona, sed non simplicia et ob hoc mutabilia. Creata sane, inquam, id est facta, non genita. Quod enim de simplici bono genitum est, pariter simplex est et hoc est quod illud de quo genitum est; quae duo Patrem et Filium dicimus; et utrumque hoc cum spiritu suo unus Deus est; qui spiritus Patris et Filii Spiritus sanctus propria quadam notione huius nominis in sacris litteris nuncupatur. Alius est autem quam Pater et Filius, quia nec Pater est nec Filius; sed "alius" dixi, non "aliud", quia et hoc pariter simplex pariterque incommutabile bonum est et coaeternum. Et haec trinitas unus est Deus; nec ideo non simplex, quia trinitas. Neque enim propter hoc naturam istam boni simplicem dicimus, quia Pater in ea solus aut solus Filius aut solus Spiritus sanctus, aut uero sola est ista nominis trinitas sine subsistentia personarum, sicut Sabelliani haeretici putauerunt; sed ideo simplex dicitur, quoniam quod habet hoc est, excepto quod relatiue quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur. Nam utique Pater habet Filium, nec tamen ipse est Filius, et Filius habet Patrem, nec tamen ipse est Pater. In quo ergo ad semet ipsum dicitur, non ad alterum, hoc est quod habet; sicut ad se ipsum dicitur vivus habendo utique uitam, et eadem uita ipse est. Propter hoc itaque natura dicitur simplex, cui non sit aliquid habere, quod uel possit amittere; uel aliud sit habens, aliud quod habet; sicut vas aliquem liquorem aut corpus colorem aut aer lucem siue feruorem aut anima sapientiam. Nihil enim horum est id quod habet; nam neque uas liquor est nec corpus color nec aer lux siue feruor neque anima sapientia est. Hinc est quod etiam privari possunt rebus, quas habent, et in alios habitus vel qualitates uerti atque mutari, ut et uas evacuetur umore quo plenum est, et corpus decoloretur et aer tenebrescat siue frigescat et anima desipiat. Sed etsi sit corpus incorruptibile, quale sanctis in resurrectione promittitur, habet quidem ipsius incorruptionis inamissibilem qualitatem, sed manente substantia corporali non hoc est, quod ipsa incorruptio. Nam illa etiam per singulas partes corporis tota est nec alibi maior, alibi minor; neque enim ulla pars est incorruptior quam altera; corpus vero ipsum maius est in toto quam in parte; et cum alia pars est in eo amplior, alia minor, non ea quae amplior est incorruptior quam quae minor. Aliud est itaque corpus, quod non ubique sui totum est, alia incorruptio, quae ubique eius tota est, quia omnis pars incorruptibilis corporis etiam ceteris inaequalis aequaliter incorrupta est. Neque enim uerbi gratia, quia digitus minor est quam tota manus, ideo incorruptibilior manus quam digitus. Ita cum sint inaequales manus et digitus, aequalis est tamen incorruptibilitas manus et digiti. Ac per hoc quamuis a corpore incorruptibili inseparabilis incorruptibilitas sit, aliud est tamen substantia, qua corpus dicitur, aliud qualitas eius, qua incorruptibile nuncupatur. Et ideo etiam sic non hoc est quod habet. Anima quoque ipsa, etiamsi semper sit sapiens, sicut erit cum liberabitur in aeternum, participatione tamen incommutabilis sapientiae sapiens erit, quae non est quod ipsa. Neque enim si aer infusa luce numquam deseratur, ideo non aliud est ipse, aliud lux qua inluminatur. Neque hoc ita dixerim, quasi aer sit anima, quod putauerunt quidam qui non potuerunt incorpoream cogitare naturam. Sed habent haec ad illa etiam in magna disparilitate quandam similitudinem, ut non inconvenienter dicatur sic inluminari animam incorpoream luce incorporea simplicis sapientiae Dei, sicut inluminatur aeris corpus luce corporea; et sicut aer tenebrescit ista luce desertus (nam nihil sunt aliud quae dicuntur locorum quorumque corporalium tenebrae quam aer carens luce), ita tenebrescere animam sapientiae luce privatam. Secundum hoc ergo dicuntur illa simplicia, quae principaliter vereque divina sunt, quod non aliud est in eis qualitas, aliud substantia, nec aliorum participatione vel divina vel sapientia vel beata sunt. Ceterum dictus est in scripturis sanctis Spiritus sapientiae multiplex, eo quod multa in sese habeat; sed quae habet, haec et est, et ea omnia unus est. Neque enim multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt infiniti quidam eique finiti theusauri rerum intellegibilium, in quibus sunt omnes invisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum etiam visibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt. Sanctus Augustinus Hipponensis, Civitate Dei, Lib. XI

Thus there is a good which is alone simple, and therefore alone unchangeable, which is God. By this Good have all others been created, but they are not simple, and therefore not unchangeable. Created, certainly, I say, that is, made, not begotten. For that which is begotten of the simple Good is simple as itself, and the same as itself, which two we call the Father and the Son, and both together with the Spirit are one God; which Spirit of the Father and the Son is the Spirit that sacred Scripture has announced as Holy, as if that epithet were its own alone. He is another than the Father and the Son, for neither is He the Father nor is He the Son, and I say 'another,' not 'another thing,' because He is with them equally the simple Good, unchangeable and coeternal. And this Trinity is one God, and none the less simple because a Trinity. We do not say that the nature of the good is simple, because the Father alone possesses it, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, nor do we say that it is a Trinity in name only, and has no real distinction of persons, as the Sabellian heretics think, but we say it is simple, because it is what it has, with the exception of the relation of the persons to one another. For the Father has a Son, and yet is not Himself the Son, and the Son has a Father, and is not Himself the Father. By this then it is said that each is what He has irrespective of the other; thus, it is said that He is in Himself living, for He has life, and is Himself the Life which He has. It is for this reason, then, that the nature of the Trinity is called simple, because it has not anything which it can lose, and because it is not one thing and what is has another, like a container and some liquid, or a body and its color, or the air and light or heat, or a mind and wisdom. For none of these is what it has: the container is not liquid, nor the body color, nor the air light and heat, nor the mind wisdom. And hence they can be deprived of what they have, and into other states or qualities can be turned and changed, so that the container may be emptied of the liquid with which it is full, the body can be discolored, the air darken or cool, the mind become unwise. But even if the incorruptible body which is promised to the holy in the resurrection has an undeniable quality of incorruption, it remains that the bodily substance and the quality of incorruption are not the same thing. For the incorruption resides entire in each part of the body, not greater here and less there, for no part is more incorruptible than another. The body, indeed, is itself greater in whole than in part, and one part is larger, another smaller, yet it is not that the larger is more incorruptible than the smaller. The body, then, which is not in each of its parts a whole body, is one thing; incorruptibility, which is throughout complete, is another thing, for every part of the incorruptible body, however unequal to the rest otherwise, is equally incorrupt. For the finger, for example, because it is less than the hand does not mean that the hand is more incorrupt than the finger; so, though finger and hand are unequal, their incorruptibility is equal. Thus, although incorruptibility is inseparable from an incorruptible body, yet the substance is one thing, which is to say the body, and the quality of incorruption is another thing. And therefore the body is not what it has. The soul itself, too, even if it always be wise, as it will be when it is liberated in eternity, it will be so by participation in the unchangeable wisdom, which it is not, for though the air never be deprived  of the light that is diffused in it, it is not the same thing as the light. I do not mean to say that the soul is air, as has been thought by some who were not able to conceive a spiritual nature; but indeed these two things despite much dissimilarity have a kind of likeness, which allows one to say quite appropriately that the immaterial soul is illumined with the immaterial light of the simple wisdom of God, like the illumination of  the material air with material light, and that, as the air becomes dark when deprived of light, for the places of material darkness are nothing else than air lacking light, so the soul becomes dark deprived of wisdom's light. According to this, then, they are called simple which are essentially and truly Divine, because in them quality and substance do not differ, and because they are without participation of anything else Divine, or wise, or blessed in themselves. It is said in Holy Scripture that the Spirit of wisdom is called manifold 1 because it has many things in it; but what it contains it is, and it being one is all these things. For there are not many wisdoms, but one, in which are untold and infinite treasures of things intellectual, in which are all invisible and unchangeable reasons of things visible and changeable which were created by it. Saint Augustine of Hippo, The City of God, Book 11 1 Wis 7:22