Something About Nothing

Omnibus fidelibus et domni nostri serenissimi principis Caroli in sacro ejus palatio consistentibus Fredigysius diaconus.  Agitatem diutissime a quampluribus quaestionem de nihilo, quam indiscussam inexaminatamque veluti impossibilem ad explicandum reliquerunt, mecum sedulo volvens, atque pertractens, tandem visum mihi fuit aggredi; eamque nodis vehementibus, quibus videbatur implicata, disruptis absolvi atque enodavi, deterosque nubilo in lucem restitui; memoriae quoque posteritatis cunctis in futurum saeculis mandandam praevidi. Quaestio autem hujusmodi est, nihilne aliquid sit, an non. Si quis responderit, Videtur mihi nihil esse, ipsa ejus quam putat negatio compellit eum fateri aliquid esse nihil. Quod tale est quasi dicat, Videtur mihi nihil quiddam esse. Quod si aliquid esse videtur ut non sit quodam modo videri non potest. Quocirca relinquitur ut aliquid esse videatur. Si vero hujusmodi fiat responsio, Videtur mihi nihil nec aliquid esse, huic responsioni obviandum est, primum ratione, in quantum hominis ratio patitur, deinde auctoritate, non qualibet, sed ratione duntaxat, quae sola auctoritas est, solaque immobilem obtinet firmitatem. Agamus itaque ratione. Omne itaque nomen finitum aliquid significat, ut homo, lapis, lignum. Haec enim ubi dicta fuerint, simul res quas fuerint significant intelligimus. Quippe hominis nomen praeter differentiam aliquam positum universalitatem hominum designat. Lapis et lignum suam similiter generalitatem complectuntur. Igitur nihil ad id quod significat refertur. Ex hoc etiam probatur non posse aliquid non esse. Omnis significatio est quod est. Nihil autem aliquid significat. Igitur nihil ejus significatio est quid est, id est, rei existentis. Epistola De Nihilo et Tenebris, Ad Proceres Palatii, Fredegesius Turonensis

To all the faithful and to our most serene prince Charles, gathered together at his sacred palace, Fredegesius the deacon. For a very long time the question about nothing being troublesome to many people, it has been undiscussed and unexamined as a thing about which it is almost impossible to give an explanation, but carefully considering it in myself and drawing it out until at last I saw it as something approachable, the strong knots in which it appeared to be bound loosening and dissolving, I then from such a cloud restored it to the light, and thought it prudent to commit it into the memory of all the ages to come. The question is: Whether nothing is something or not? If someone responds, 'It seems to me to be nothing,' by this denial itself he is compelled to admit that something is nothing. It is as if he were to say, 'It seems to me that nothing is a certain thing.' But if it seems to be something it is unable not to appear to be in any way. Thus it remains that it seems to be something. If then this is the response: 'It seems to me to be nothing not something,' this answer is opposed first by reasoning, insofar as human reason permits, next by authority, but not any authority, but only insofar as it accords with reason, which alone is an authority and which alone obtains immovable strength. Let us act, therefore, in accordance with reason. Every finite name signifies something, so: man, stone, wood. When these are said, at the same time we understand the things they signify. Of course, the name man without any qualifier designates the universal term man and stone and wood in similar fashion are grasped. Therefore nothing signifies something to which it refers. By which it is proved that it is not able to be something which does not exist. Every signification is of something and even nothing signifies something. Therefore, nothing signifies something which is, that is, an existing thing. Letter on Nothing and Darkness, To the Nobles of the Palace, Fredegesius of Tours